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"The memory of Nazi Germany's destruction of 'other' bodies
weighs upon the design of any contemporary medical experiment
that involves human subjects. "I
INTRODUCTION
There exists a divide between the principle that research should not
proceed without the subject's free and informed consent and the reality
of human medical research. 2 Since the 1940s, there have been repeated
efforts to create principles and rules for the protection of the human sub-
t J.D., Cornell Law School, 2002; B.A., Rutgers College, 1999. The Author wishes to
extend her deepest gratitude to Benjamin M. Meier and Renee Roman, and in particular to
John and Henryka Roman, for their support.
I Jay Dyckman, The Myth of Informed Consent: An Analysis of the Doctrine of
Informed Consent and Its (Mis)Application in HIV Experiments on Pregnant Women in
Developing Countries, 9 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 91, 92 (1999).
2 George F. Tomossy & David N. Weisstub, "Consensual" Research with Cognitively
Impaired Adults: Resolving Legal Shortcomings in Adult Guardianship, in RESEARCH ON
HUMAN SUBJECTS 137 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
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jects of medical research.3 Even before the relatively recent proliferation
of various regulations and specifications for human medical research by
various private organizations and individual nations, the Nuremberg
Code was created as the first international code affirming the human
rights of human research subjects. 4 The Nuremberg Code utilized the
doctrine of informed consent as a means of protecting the human subject.
This principle remains the foundation underlying human medical re-
search ethics.5 However, despite the existence of the Code and many
subsequently enacted regulations, there is still considerable question as to
whether these protections provide sufficient legal protection for human
research subjects today. There remains a substantial gap between the
espoused principle of informed consent and its actual implementation.6
This Note argues that the specific situation of AIDS vaccine testing
in Africa provides evidence that the protections offered to human medi-
cal research subjects in and by the U.S. are inadequate. A new standard
is necessary: the United States should adopt the Nuremberg Code into
law. Part I examines the specific example of U.S. AIDS vaccine testing
in Africa. Part II discusses the history of the laws governing medical
research ethics, as well as current forces affecting research today. Part
III of this Note suggests that the time has come for the United States to
acknowledge the past failure of federal regulations to protect human sub-
jects adequately. This requires an honest and public commitment to the
respect of human rights when conducting human medical research both
3 George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation Nuremberg:
Helsinki and Beyond, in 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (1992). The difficult dilemma of ethics within
medical research came to the forefront as a result of the revelations concerning the experi-
ments conducted by Nazi physicians on concentration camp prisoners during World War II.
The Nuremberg Code, which resulted from the Nuremberg Trials, has remained one of the
premier human rights documents regarding international research standards. Id. Successive
sources of principles within the area of medical research ethics include the Declaration of
Helsinki, CIOMS guidelines, and the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine. See
infra notes 73 and 84.
4 Barry R. Bloom, The Highest Attainable Standard: Ethical Issues in AIDS Vaccines,
SCIENCE, JAN. 9, 1998, at 186. "Codification of ethical precepts for experimentation on human
beings derives from the Nuremberg Code of 1947.... Many industrialized counties, including
the United States, have established their own ethical guidelines for human experimentation,
but that is rarely the case for developing countries." Id. E.g., NAT'L COMM. FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT RE-
PORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
RESEARCH, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0014 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Gov't Printing Office,
1988); 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1996), 21 C.F.R. § 50 (1996), 21 C.F.R. § 56 (1996); U.S. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, CONSULTATION ON INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) RESEARCH (1990).
5 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 96 (noting that "[t]he Nuremberg Code's emphasis on the
notion of informed consent has been affirmed by several successive declarations and codes
concerning human experimentation").
6 David J. Rothman, Bringing Ethics to Human Experimentation: The American Experi-
ence, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
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at home and abroad. The U.S. can achieve this by adopting the Nurem-
berg Code and affirm its commitment to the Code's basic principles.
This implementation could be the very impetus necessary to bridge the
gap between professed ideals and practice, ushering in a true realization
of informed consent for all humanity.
I. AIDS VACCINE TRIALS IN AFRICA
AIDS has relentlessly impacted developing countries. 7 UNAIDS
and WHO estimate that the number of people living with HIV or AIDS
at the end of the year 2000 was 36.1 million.8 The combined statistics of
SubSaharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East of both adults and
children living with HIV/AIDS was 25.7 million.9 As a result, Africa is
home to 70% of the adults and 80% of the children living with HIV in
the world. African countries are faltering from the devastating impact of
this disease. 10
The scientific community has declared that the best and most likely
hope for stemming this global epidemic is the development of yet-undis-
covered preventative HIV vaccines. I The FDA approved the first drug,
zidovudine, commonly known as AZT, for use against HIV and AIDS in
1987.12 In February 1994, the Data Safety and Monitoring Board of the
U.S. National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases found a sig-
nificant positive result in children born to HIV positive mothers, when
the pregnant women, infected with HIV, received zidovudine (AZT). 13
The trials conducted in France and the United States found that a regi-
men during the later stages of pregnancy could reduce the chance of HIV
7 Bloom, supra note 4, at 186.
8 Global Summary of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic, December 2000, at http://




In South Africa, the epidemic is projected to reduce the economic growth rate by
0.3-0.4% annually, resulting by the year 2010 in a gross domestic product (GDP)
17% lower than it would have been without AIDS and wiping US$ 22 billion off the
country's economy. Even in diamond-rich Botswana, the country with the highest
per capita GDP in Africa, in the next 10 years AIDS will slice 20% off the govern-
ment budget, erode development gains, and bring about a 13% reduction in the in-
come of the poorest households.
Id.
11 Bloom, supra note 4, at 186. Many developing countries are unable to afford drug
therapies, leaving only counseling to decrease potentially harmful behavior. Id.
12 John Henkel, Attacking AIDS with a 'Cocktail' Therapy, FDA CONSUMER, July-Aug.
1999, at http://www.fda.gov//fdac/features/1999/499_aids.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
13 Ronald Bayer, The Debate Over Maternal-Fetal HIV Transmission Prevention Trials
in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean: Racist Exploitation or Exploitation of Racism?, 88 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 567 (1998). The information found was part of a study that was interrupted and
the findings were based on preliminary data.
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transmission to the child by two-thirds.' 4 However, the treatment was
prohibitively expensive, costing nearly $1,000 per patient, thereby mak-
ing it unavailable to most women in developing countries. 15 "Short
course" AZT trials were suggested to determine whether less-expensive
alternatives could produce the same effects while reducing the amount of
AZT needed to block transmission of HIV from mother to child. 16 These
trials would experiment with the variations of already known drug regi-
mens of AZT in an effort to find a drug regimen that was both less com-
plex to administer and less expensive. The trial also included a control
group destined solely to receive placebos. 17
A. U.S. INVOLVEMENT
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) paid for and developed these trials
"aimed to test the efficacy of a "short course" of AZT ... in preventing
perinatal transmission of HIV."' 8 Beginning in 1997, CDC and NIH
conducted studies involving more than 12,000 women in countries in-
cluding Thailand, the Dominican Republic, and several African coun-
tries. 19 These studies were specifically designed so that half of the
mother-participants would receive a placebo. 20 It is estimated that more
than 1,000 babies contracted the AIDS virus because of the placebo treat-
ment given to their mothers. 2'
14 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 92. This study was known as AIDS Clinical Trial Group
(ACTG) Study 076. Id. at 92 n.5, citing Sheryl Gay Stolberg, U.S. AIDS Research Abroad
Sets off Outcry Over Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1997, at Al. The ACTG 076 regimen
required the subject mother to take AZT five times a day for the last six months of her preg-
nancy and intravenously during labor, and the infant to have AZT four times a day for six
weeks. Id.
15 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 92. The sad irony of the success of AZT was that the
treatment was affordable only in industrial nations, where mother-fetal transmissions are a
more limited problem, denying AZT use in regions where it was tested. It is specifically in
developing countries, "where maternal-fetal transmission represents an epidemiologically sig-
nificant disaster, [that] the costs of prophylactic treatment (disregarding the absence of the
infrastructure necessary for intravenous treatment during delivery) put treatment with
zidovudine out of reach." Bayer, supra note 13, at 567.
16 Jonathan Todres, Can Research Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Countries
Sue Physician-Investigators for Human Rights Violations?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 738
(2000).
17 Bloom, supra note 4, at 186. The short-course of AZT consists of oral AZT in the last
four weeks of pregnancy as well as during labor. Todres, supra note 16, at 737.
t8 Todres, supra note 16, at 738.
19 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 92; Todres, supra note 16, at 737 n.l("There had been
sixteen clinical trials ongoing at sites in Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, the
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Nine
of the studies were funded by the CDC or the National Institutes for Health (NIH), both U.S.
Government agencies. In total, fifteen of the trials involved the use of placebos.").




Those opposed to the short course AIDS vaccine research in devel-
oping countries questioned the lack of respect for the Nuremberg Code
evident in these experiments.2 2 Critics also claimed that the evidence
resulting from the earlier French and American experiments would be an
adequate measure by which to compare the effect of the short course
AZT treatment. As a result, a placebo control is unnecessary.
23
Former U.S. Senator Carol Moseley Braun (D-IL) publicly de-
nounced the federal government for funding AIDS research experiments
on women in developing countries. 24 Senator Moseley-Braun suggested
that these experiments violated the World Health Organization guide-
lines, which mandate that a treatment can only be compared to a placebo
when there is no known effective treatment available, instead, subjects in
the research group must receive the "best known treatment." 25 Public.
Citizen, a Washington, D.C. based interest group publicly decried the
trials as violations of the Nuremberg Code, stating: "Researchers in-
volved in these experiments have exploited the inadequacies of the
health-care systems in these developing countries to conduct research
they would never even consider in the U.S." 2 6
The informed consent employed in the AZT trials in Africa is prob-
lematic at best, considering the contrasting positions of knowledge, au-
thority and wealth between the researchers and test subjects. 27 There is
evidence that suggests the subjects of the experiment did not give the
requisite informed consent as required by the Nuremberg Code. 28 There
22 Id. at 92.
23 Marcia Angell, The Ethics of Clinical Research in the Third World, 337 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 847, 849 (1997) (referencing ACTG Study 076).
24 Chinta Strausberg, U.S. Funded Experiment Unethical, N.Y. BEACON, Oct. 15, 1997.
25 Id.
26 Letter to the Department of Health and Human Services Concerning Unethical Studies
Which Used Placebos on HIV-Positive Pregnant Women in Developing Countries (April 22,
1997), at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6627 ("On this 50"' year since
the commencement of the Nuremberg doctor trials, it is disheartening in the extreme that, at a
minimum, four of the ten principles of the Code have been abrogated in this research.").
27 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 102.
28 Id. at 98-99.
Testimony from some of the African participants in these studies offers compelling
reasons to doubt the sufficiency of informed consent, regardless of the researchers'
good intentions; indeed, many participants have expressed confusion about the test.
One twenty-three-year-old infected mother was questioned repeatedly by a journalist
about what a placebo is and why it was being used. She responded, "They gave me
a bunch of pills to take and told me how to take them. Some were for malaria, some
were for fevers, and some were supposed to be for the virus. I knew that there were
different kinds, but I figured that if one of them didn't work against AIDS, then one
of the other ones would." Like many of 'the participants, this mother was illiterate,
unemployed, and unmarried. A reporter for the New York Times, Howard French,
noted that this mother's reasons for enrolling in these tests were clear to her: "It
2002]
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were also subjects of the AZT study who chose to participate even after
full disclosure, but it was their lack of financial resources and access to
the treatment that ultimately influenced their decision to join the study.29
All of this information contrasts starkly with the assertion by the CDC
that "[w]omen [were] clearly told that the AZT regimen might or might
not be effective. . . .It [was] clearly explained to the women involved
that some would receive AZT and others would receive a placebo.
30
This reality is compounded when the specific social and economic
elements of Africa are revealed. 3 1 The present social order: the fifty-
percent higher illiteracy rate for women, the inability of women to own
property in several African nations, and the "pervasive attitude that wo-
men must yield sexual decision-making to men," 32 both subordinates wo-
men and increases the probability of the spread of HIV as well as the
probability of involuntary consent. During the U.N. Global Conference
on HIV/AIDS in June 2001, the vulnerability of women with regards to
contracting AIDS was specifically discussed. The Declaration of Com-
mitment adopted by the General Assembly declared that the empower-
ment of women was necessary to lower their vulnerability. 33 Given the
totality of the situation for the women-subjects, it is questionable
whether their decision can truly be labeled either informed or
consensual. 34
offered her and her infant free health care and a hope to shield her baby from a
deadly infection."
Id. at 98-99, quoting Howard W. French, AIDS Research in Africa: Juggling Risks and Hopes,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at IA. This was not an isolated incident. The journalist conducted
interviews with other subjects in the study and found that many did not actually understand the
issues involved. Id.
29 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 99-100. "[O]ther mothers, ... French reports, 'acknowl-
edged that they understood little' of the tests but hoped to save their children or get 'free health
care' that they could not otherwise afford." Id. at 100. It is the situation itself in Africa that
makes the experiments inherently coercive. By comparison, a breast cancer research experi-
ment conducted in Britain that utilized placebos clearly showed how the country in which the
study is held may in fact influence the study itself. The British study had a difficult time
getting volunteers to participate in a study testing a new drug that purported to prevent breast
cancer in those who were at high risk. One British researcher involved commented that people
with financial resources do not have to accept the consequences of a placebo when they are in
a position to receive treatment with known results. Charles Arthur, Science: Are Scientific
Trials Blind to Suffering?, INDEP. (London), Oct. 28, 1997, at N8.
30 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 100 n.33 (citing Charles W. Henderson, CDC Explains Its
Stand on Controversial Third World AZT Study, AIDS WEEKLY PLUS, July 28, 1997).
31 Id. at 101.
32 Id. at 101, n.36.
33 Farnaz Fassihi, Empower Women to Help AIDS War, U.N. Strategy Says, STAR
LEDGER, Jul. I, 2001, at 3. In many African countries, women cannot refuse unwanted or
unprotected sex, nor can they create safe sex, even in marriages. Id.
34 Id. See also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, 190 (questioning whether women on
welfare, when offered financial incentives to use Norplant, can truly be said to be in a "volun-
tary" position considering their economic status and personal circumstances).
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C. REACTIONS
Those in favor of the trials dismissed the argument that the trials
were unethical. 35 The head of the NIH, Harold Varmus, the head of the
CDC, David Satcher, as well as Michael Merson, the executive director
of the WHO Global Program on AIDS, vigorously supported the trials. 36
The proponents claimed that the actual question was whether it was ethi-
cal to conduct such trials in a developing country where the therapy
would have been unavailable anyway. 37 Under this reasoning, the AZT
drug trial was thereby justifiable on the basis that no treatment was the
actual standard of care in Africa. 38 Proponents argued, with a relativist
perspective, that it was unreasonable to impose "burdensome American
values and requirements on other nations. '' 39 Because Africa is a com-
munity-centered society, rather than an individual-centered society such
as the United States, the oversight necessary in the United States would
not be appropriate in Africa, argued proponents. 40 This view is reflected
in the CIOMS Guidelines. The CIOMS Guidelines of 1982 address the
issue of obtaining informed consent in community-centered societies by
working through intermediaries, or community leaders. 4' However, the
proponents of the research risk confusing what is culturally relative with
economic inequality in order to support their view.42
On February 17, 1998, the CDC unexpectedly announced the end of
the short course AIDS vaccine research in Africa because of the ade-
quacy of the results obtained from the drug research in Thailand, the first
available results from the study.43 This announcement abruptly halted
35 Bayer, supra note 13, at 567 (arguing that this trial is unlike Tuskegee, in which there
was actual concerted effort to keep the subjects from receiving therapy); Joseph Saba & Arthur
Amann, Drug Tests Offer Hope to Victims, ARIz. REPUBLIc, Sept. 23, 1997, at B7.
36 Harold Varmus & David Satcher, Ethical Complexities of Conducting Research in
Developing Countries, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1003, 1005 (1997). Beyond the specific exam-
ple of the AIDS trials, there are those who criticize the reliance on informed consent as a
marker for acceptable medical research in general, labeling it as simply too idealistic: "we
follow it like a signpost pointing the way to our ideal of relations based on equality and
respect." Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and the Eth-
ics of Autonomy, 36 CArT. LAw 455, 508 (1996).
37 Bayer, supra note 13, at 567. The question framed by those in favor of the research
then becomes: "What is the standard of care in this particular developing nation?"
38 Dr. David D. Ho, It's AIDS, Not Tuskegee; Inflammatory Comparisons Won't Save
Lives in Africa, TIME, Sept. 29, 1997, at 83.
39 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 104.
40 A Growing Dichotomy: The Gap Between Therapeutic Haves and Have-Nots, AIDS
ALERT, Jan. 1, 1998.
41 World Health Org. & Council for Int'l Org. of Med. Science, Proposed International
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, reprinted in HUMAN EXPERI-
MEN IATION AND MEDICAL Erirics (Zbigniew Bankowski & Norman Howard-Jones eds.,
1982).
42 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 109.
43 Todres, supra note 16, at 737 n.l.
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the ever-controversial research, which had been surrounded by questions,
criticisms, and ardent support from its very beginnings. 44
II. MEDICAL RESEARCH STANDARDS: A
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. THE NUREMBERG CODE
Following World War II, Nazi physicians who experimented on
their prisoners during the war were tried before the Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg.45 The Tribunal explained that any human medical experi-
mentation had to remain within certain specifically delineated boundaries
to comply with acceptable norms of ethical human research.46 The
judges viewed the experimentation performed by the Nazi researchers as
"horrendous non-therapeutic, nonconsensual prison research" 47 well
outside the bounds of medical ethics and international law. Those in-
volved in the experiments were prisoners in Nazi concentration camps-
mostly Jews, Gypsies and Slavs.48
The Military Tribunal based the Nuremberg Code on natural law,
protecting individual rights over the right of the researcher to his or her
scientific endeavor.49 This concept was a direct response to the view in
Nazi Germany that certain groups were simply not worthy of "medicine
or bodily integrity because of social or political construction of their bod-
ies as inferior. ' 50 it was a focused attempt to prevent the horrors that
created its very existence. 5' The Code set forth two key concepts: 1) that
the informed consent of the human research subject is required and 2)
44 Id. at 737.
45 Annas, supra note 3, at 120. U.S. judges sat in judgement of these very experimenters
and therefore became an integral part of the creation of the Nuremberg Code. Beyond simply
using American judges, the prosecutors and the criminal procedure rules at Nuremberg were
also American. Kevin M. King, A Proposal for the Effective International Regulation of Bi-
omedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 34 ST. J. I. L. 163, 167 n.26 (1998).
46 Michelle D. Miller, Note, The Informed-Consent Policy of the International Confer-
ence on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use: Knowledge Is the Best Medicine, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203, 204 (1997). Before
World War I, the legal issues surrounding medical experimentation were largely absent from
the American public. The evidence of the medical experiments conducted by Nazi doctors
forced the issue to the attention of Americans for the first time. Id.
47 Annas, supra note 3, at 119.
48 Id.
49 Id.; Dyckman supra note I, at 91 ("Called the Nuremberg Code, this document pro-
vides guidance to those in the medical field by structuring a means to achieve the goal of
securing the bodily integrity of each human subject.").
50 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 119.
51 Id. at 95. Although references to "voluntary" consent and "free power of choice"
"clearly envision the doctrine's application in a context involving autonomous, empowered
individuals," the Nazi experiments were not an example of the same. Id.
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that research is not justified simply based on the fact that the subject
gave informed consent.52
The first principle of the Nuremberg Code requires consent that is
voluntary, informed, competent, and made with true understanding. 53
But informed consent is not the only condition. There are eight other
provisions of the Nuremberg Code which relate to the welfare of the
research subject and must be satisfied before seeking the subject's in-
formed consent. 54 The research subject cannot voluntarily waive any of
these requirements. 55 These additional requirements include the creation
of a valid research design seeking otherwise unobtainable information
that is important for the good for all of society; the avoidance of unnec-
essary suffering and injury; no actual reason to believe that death or disa-
bling injury will result from the research; the determination that benefits
surpass possible risks; the right to withdraw from the experiment; and the
involvement of a qualified researcher who is prepared to end the research
if it "is likely to result in the injury, disability, or death of the experimen-
tal study." 56
The international status of the Nuremberg Code was cemented with
the creation and widespread ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which incorporated the consent requirement. 57
In addition, because the Nuremberg Code was based on international nat-
ural law and ethics, its standard cannot be lowered by any group of re-
searchers. It is also true that no rule in any individual country can
52 Todres, supra note 16, at 743.
53 THE NUREMBERG CODE, reprinted in THE NAZI DOCTOR AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:




56 Annas, supra note 3, at 121, quoting The Nuremberg Code:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent;
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the
intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to
make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that
before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there
should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment;
the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and
hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which
may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
57 M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond Consent, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 44, 55 n.22
(David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
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derogate from the international standards expressed in the Nuremberg
Code.58
The Code then clearly holds as its priority, the informed consent of
any human research subjects. 59 The particular subject involved in the
model of informed consent is assumed to be a rational decision-maker
participating only after having been given all relevant information and
having evaluated the risks and benefits according to his or her own per-
sonal set of values.60 However, as the terms and concepts become more
common in medical research parlance, the possible interpretations of the
terms of the Nuremberg Code become more variable. 6'
The theory underlying informed consent must be coupled, and con-
trasted, with the presumed physician/researcher authority under the pa-
ternalistic ideology of medical professionalism. 62 Not only are subjects
of a disease vulnerable because of their physical suffering, but there is
also vulnerability as a result of the unequal relationship between the sub-
ject and the doctor-researcher. 63 The subject cannot recover without the
doctor-researcher, and the doctor appears to hold the knowledge that will
heal the subject-patient. However, in order to receive this desired help,
the patient necessarily must place him or herself into the doctor's care
and thereby trust the abilities of the researcher. 64 This signature is espe-
cially important in human research because the patient is simultaneously
a research subject. 65 Historically, physicians have espoused the theory
that their patients' needs are always best served by following doctor's
orders; a benevolent form of paternalism. The physician's demand of
complete control over the patient and his or her needs, and the belief that
they can be trusted to safeguard their patients, is propelled further by the
assumption that the patients themselves are simply unable to comprehend
the depths of medicine's knowledge. 66 The doctrine of informed consent
58 Annas, supra note 3, at 124.
59 Jonathan D. Moreno, Lessons Learned: A Half-Century of Experimenting on Humans,
THE HUMANIST, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 9; Miller, supra note 46, at 207-08.
Given that the judgment originated from a U.S. trial complete with U.S. judges, prosecutors,
and criminal procedure, an objective observer might have expected that U.S. courts would use
the Nuremberg Code as the legal standard for medical experimentation. However, it was not
until 1973, more than twenty-five years later, that any court cited the Code. The delay might
be partially attributable to the extreme nature of the Nazi experiments-no court wanted to
compare an American doctor to a Nazi physician.
60 Id.
David N. Weisstub, Roles in Clinical and Research Ethics, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS
56, 69 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
61 Annas, supra note 3, at 123.
62 Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 18 (1993).
63 David C. Thomasma & Edmund D. Pellegrino, Medicine, Science, Self-Interest: Value
Sets in Conflict, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTs (David N.'Weisstub ed., 1998).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Katz, supra note 62, at 19.
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has done little to moderate the idealized opinion of physician authority,
leaving the decision-making process still generally under physician
control. 67
B. THE DECLARATION OF HELSINKI
For all of its international weight, physicians and researchers criti-
cized the Nuremberg Code both for the way it was created as well as for
its substantive deficiencies. 68 Because judges created the Code, and not
other researchers, physician-researchers thought the Code inapplicable to
their own practices. Physicians believed that Nuremberg itself did not
have much to do with the medical establishment, it had to do only with
war crimes.69 Although doctors were involved as witnesses in the trial
and were also called as consultants, the Nuremberg Code itself was cre-
ated by judges, realized through a court, and established without medical
professional standing. 70 As such, the Code was truly outside medicine.
This externality suggested to Americans that the Code was in no way
relevant to them.71 Additionally, judges made no particular attempt to
deal with special issues, such as children, patients, or the mentally-im-
paired. As a result, physicians found the Code confining and more aptly
described as a human rights document. 72 This criticism resulted in a
proliferation of more permissive alternative documents governing human
experimentation, one being the Declaration of Helsinki adopted by the
World Medical Assembly in 1964.7 3 In direct response to the problems
physicians perceived in the Nuremberg Code, this new Declaration con-
sisted merely of recommendations by physicians to physicians.74 The
goal of the Declaration was to establish a more relaxed medical ethics
67 Katz, supra note 62, at 20. In practice, the general concepts of disclosure and consent
are consistently taken lightly because doctors/researchers do not consider patient/research sub-
jects as equals. Id. at 23-24.
68 Annas, supra note 3, at 122. Those who dismiss the Code say it is simply too de-
manding and idealistic. Garnett, supra note 36, at 473. "[Ilts standards are too high for neces-
sary research to meet, and . . . its absolutism cannot compete with the utilitarian and
impersonal ethics of modem medicine." Id. at 472.
69 Rothman, supra note 6, at 35.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 35-36 (noting that the Code was contemporaneous with the Cold War as well as
the public health campaign to eradicate disease).
72 Annas, supra note 3, at 122.
73 DECLARATION OF HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS GUIDING DOCTORS IN CLINICAL RE-
SEARCH, reprinted in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 331, 331 (George J. Annas & Michael Grodin eds., 1992) (1964).
The Helsinki Declaration was first promulgated in 1964 and amended three times since. An-
nas, supra note 3, at 122.
74 Annas, supra note 3, at 122. In fact, the Declaration was subtitled "recommendations
guiding doctors in clinical research." Id.
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model that permitted paternalism, 75 expressing a more "benign modem
attitude toward biomedical research." 7 6
The essence of the Declaration divides research into the therapeutic
and the non-therapeutic, allowing for paternalism in the exceptions af-
forded therapeutic research. 77 Therapeutic research is said to extend to
the subject an acceptable probability that the research/therapy will be
helpful to the health of the subject, having as its ultimate objective, the
well-being of the subject. 78 Research and experimentation, or non-thera-
peutic research, is said to benefit the advancement of knowledge and
society as a whold, such that the overriding objective is to serve scientific
knowledge generally.79 However, these categories are not absolute nor
are they mutually exclusive. There may be research situations where it
cannot readily be determined where the benefit lies.80
In 1964, the Declaration of Helsinki adopted an informed consent
provision.8 However, the Declaration claims the following two con-
cerns as priority: "first, that the individual human subject's health is val-
ued over competing gains to others, and second, that the best known
treatment available be used."'8 2 This tension between the required in-
formed consent stressed in the Nuremberg Code and the preferred prior
peer review in The Declaration of Helsinki has led physicians to all but
abandon the Code in favor of the more lenient Declaration.
75 Id. "U.S. researcher Henry Beecher probably best expressed medicine's delight with
the Declaration of Helsinki's ascendancy when he said in 1970: 'The Nuremberg Code
presents a rigid act of legalistic demands .... The Declaration of Helsinki, on the other hand,
presents a set of guides. It is an ethical as opposed to a legalistic document and is thus more
broadly useful than the one formulated at Nuremberg'." Id. at 122-23.
76 Wendy K. Mariner, AIDS Research and the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZi DOCTORS
AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 286, 289 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
77 Annas, supra note 3, at 123. Therapeutic is defined as "Medical Research Combined
with Professional Care." Id.; see also Miller, supra note 46, at 209 (describing non-therapeutic
experimentation which has as its only purpose, to test a hypothesis, and therapeutic research,
created to help the human subject as well as aid the researcher).
78 Simon N. Verdun-Jones & David N. Weisstub, Drawing the Distinction Between
Therapeutic Research and Non-Therapeutic Experimentation: Clearing a Way Through the
Definitional Thicket, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS, supra note 2, at 92. It understanda-
bly seems that there is less to fear in therapeutic research because the end goal is to help that
particular research subject. But even these subjects could be led to believe that they are re-
ceiving a known cure and not simply testing a possible cure. See Mariner, supra note 76, at
292.
79 Verdun-Jones & Weisstub, supra note 78, at 93.
80 Id. at 98. The Random Clinical Trial is just one example where the objectives may be
mixed. A subject may be cured by the treatment, but in such trials, the different treatments are
not specifically created for the subject and the one subject's end result is not the specifically
desired outcome. Id. at 104-05.
81 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 96. "Strengthening the informed consent provision in later
declarations, in 1989 the Declaration' of Helsinki of the World Health Organization issued
ethical guidelines concerning informed consent..." Id.




Another set of standards arising from the dissatisfaction with Nu-
remberg principles was a joint project in 1982 between WHO (the World
Health Organization) and CIOMS (the Council for International Organi-
zations of Medical Sciences), creating the Guidelines for Medical Ethics
in Biomedical Research.8 3 The creators of the Guidelines felt that the
informed consent of the Nuremberg Code was inadequate as a basis for
protection, and instead, worked to prevent abuses. 84 These Guidelines
are unique in international regulations because they offer the basic ethi-
cal principles under which all human research projects ought to be for-
mulated.8 5 The basic principles include "respect for persons,
beneficence and justice."8 6 The Guidelines were meant to support and
help implement Helsinki IV.87 These Guidelines were created with the
help of drug regulatory agencies from WHO's member states and pur-
posefully set out to create globally applicable standards of human medi-
cal research. 8 But the Guidelines were not offered as legal text, rather,
it was offered as a framework which countries could use to build their
own respective regulations.8 9 As a result, despite the positive attributes
of the ethical Guidelines, they are utterly unenforceable without volun-
tary enactment by a nation's legislature or a specific application by a
nation's judiciary. 90
D. AMERICAN MEDICAL RESEARCH REGULATIONS
The AZT trials in Africa are not the only example of U.S. medical
researchers disregarding Nuremberg principles. 9 1 One of the most noto-
rious examples was the Fort Detrick, Maryland LSD experiments from
83 COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, INTERNA-
TIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (GE-
NEVA: CIOMS, 1993). The Guidelines were published as the International Ethical Guidelines
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. King, supra note 45, at 182. The Guide-
lines were revised in 1991. Id.
84 King, supra note 45, at 182-83. Unlike the Declaration of Helsinki (at least before
1989), the Guidelines required all experiments involving human research subjects to pass
through the review of an IRB. Id. at 183. The Guidelines also included statements on vulnera-
ble populations, compensation for injury, and research in developing nations. Id.
85 Sev S. Fluss, The Regulation of Human Experimentation: Historical and Contempo-
rary Perspectives, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 222, 229 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 229-32.
89 King, supra note 45, at 182.
90 Id. at 184.
91 Miller, supra note 46, at 210 n.45. Given that the judgment originated from a U.S.
trial complete with U.S. judges, prosecutors, and criminal procedure, an objective observer
might have expected that U.S. courts would use the Nuremberg Code as the legal standard for
medical experimentation. However, it was not until 1973, more than twenty-five years later,
that any court cited the Code. The delay might be partially attributable to the extreme nature
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1953 through 1971, where "approximately 6,700 human subjects were
used by the [United States] government in experiments involving
psychoactive chemicals. In private contract research with universities
and chemical companies, other agents were also used, including mor-
phine, Demerol, Seconal, mescaline, atrophine, and psilocybin. ' '92 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court refused to allow a suit against the United
States for injuries resulting from these experiments, labeling them as "in-
cident to service" under the legal Feres Doctrine. 93 In his failed attempt
to have the U.S. Supreme Court recognize the Nuremberg Code within
the U.S. armed forces, Master Sergeant James B. Stanley was barred
from suing the United States for involving him in LSD experiments with-
out his knowledge or consent after a 5-4 vote.94
Another infamous example was the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, con-
ducted by Public Health Service physicians from 1932 through 1972,
where penicillin was denied to nearly 400 uninformed, poor, African-
American sharecroppers in order to track the normal course of the dis-
ease. 95 In 2001, a research subject died after participating in an asthma
experiment conducted by Johns Hopkins researchers. 96 Preliminary find-
ings noted failures by the researchers in reporting previous reactions, in
following the plan of preparation for the administered drug and in notify-
ing the subject that the drug was experimental. 97 The need for the United
States to adopt the Nuremberg Code and ratify the informed consent
principle contained within is more urgent than ever.
In general, the federal regulations currently available are much more
permissive regarding human medical research than the Nuremberg
Code.98 The federal government became involved in the regulation of
human medical research beginning in 1962.99 The impetus for federal
involvement resulted after a series of exposes concerning unethical re-
search generated public outcry in the 1960s and early 1970s. These ex-
pos6s, in turn, placed pressure on the federal government, or more
of the Nazi experiments-no court wanted to compare an American doctor to a Nazi physi-
cian. Id. at 207-08. Moreno, supra note 59, at 9.
92 Moreno, supra note 59, at 9.
93 Id. at 10.
94 Id. at 9-10; U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
95 Katz, supra note 62, at 8 n.3.
96 Laurence K., Altman, F.D.A. Faults Johns Hopkins Over Process in Fatal Asthma
Study, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2001; Gina Kolata, Johns Hopkins Admits Fault in Fatal Experi-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2001. Johns Hopkins accepted full responsibility for the death,
reporting that the researcher and the ethics committee failed to adequately protect the research
subject. Id.
97 Kolata, supra note 96.
98 Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and Regu-
lations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 183, 198 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
99 Id. at 186. The FDA became involved after the Drug Amendments Act of 1962. Id.
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specifically, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to establish regula-
tions for human research.' 00 The impact of the public disapproval was
intensified because the federal government was the usual source of funds
for such research.' 10 The NIH gave the grants and the NIH received its
funds from Congressional appropriations. 102
But it was not until 1966 that the FDA created patient consent regu-
lations clarifying the federal government's policy on consent in medical
research. 10 3 Also in 1966, the NIH began the policy of requiring Institu-
tional Review Boards (IRBs) to review research in order to obtain or
continue grants, thereby beginning the U.S. institutional focus.' 4 The
protection of the IRBs became the chosen federal option, instead of a
permanent regulatory commission, 10 5 showcasing the general tone of
federal involvement: attempting to protect subjects but not if such protec-
tion would hinder important research. 106,
The regulation of research by IRBs was started into motion by Sur-
geon General William Stewart in 1966, by Policy and Procedure Order
129 (PPO 129). 107 That policy has been expanded and revised consider-
ably until it reached its current position where IRBs are now required by
sixteen departments and agencies of the federal government, which in-
cludes all research by the FDA. 10 8 The main objective of the IRB is to
protect a human research subject's rights and general welfare. 109 IRBs
100 Rothman, supra note 6, at 39. One publication was in 1966 by Harvard Medical
School professor Henry Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research" in The New England Journal
of Medicine which described twenty-two experiments that were seriously questionable in
terms of ethicality. Id. In order to make the information more widely known, Beecher brought
news of the article to the general press which spearheaded the later public outcry. Id. This
public outcry was consistent with the general feeling of social consciousness evident in the
1960s. Id.
101 Id. at 41.
102 Id.
103 Glantz, supra note 98, at 198.
104 Id. The IRB was not involved in Nuremberg, but it has been one of the only advances
since Nuremberg. It can be seen as an additional protection when relying on consent is not
enough to protect the subject's rights.
105 Bernard Starkman, Models for Regulating Research: The Council of Europe and Inter-
national Trends, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 264, 266-67 (David N. Weisstub ed.,
1998).
106 Glantz, supra note 98, at 187. The Declaration of Helsinki also calls for IRBs. "The
design and performance of each experiment procedure involving human subjects should be
clearly formulated in an experimental protocol which should be transmitted to a specially ap-
pointed independent committee for consideration, comment and guidance." Annas, supra note
3, at 123 (quoting Principle 1.2 of the 1989 revision of the Declaration (Helsinki IV)).
107 Charles R. McCarthy, The Institutional Review Board: Its Origins, Purpose, Function,
and Future, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 301, 307 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998).
108 Id. at 316.
109 Id.; Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues In the Review of Medical Research on Human
Subjects, 1 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 3 (1991). "[Olne of the entities that examines research
proposals ... [is] the Institutional Review Board (IRB). IRBs exist in many institutions in
which research involving human subjects is performed. They are charged with the responsibil-
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accomplish this by reviewing research protocols, whether directly 1 o or
indirectly."'I Federal regulations require that every institution receiving
a federal grant establish an IRB, with at least five people, and receive its
approval before conducting human medical research. 1 2 The IRB is re-
quired to examine the protocol to weigh the risks against the benefits and
determine that the researchers have communicated appropriately with the
research subjects and have received their informed consent.' 1 3 The fed-
eral regulations do not, however, dictate the specifics of the IRBs, leav-
ing that to the insiders of the research community." 14 In the end, the
reviews conducted by an IRB depend greatly on the construct and con-
science of its members.' 15
In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act, which estab-
lished the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, a panel that advises the govern-
ment on medical ethics.' 16 Based on the information provided by the
Commission, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) 1 7 created regulations for all federally funded medical research
involving human subjects. 1 8 In 1974, the federal government adopted
the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, a joint effort of
the Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug
Administration, often called the "Common Rule." Its purpose was to
harmonize the various informal federal regulations. 19 These regulations
included eight standards for establishing informed consent. 20 The gen-
ity of reviewing, evaluating, and approving or disapproving researchers' plans to include
human subjects in their investigations." Id. at 1.
110 An example might be reviewing documents.
111 An example might be community education. Moore, supra note 109, at 3.
112 Rothman, supra note 6, at 41.
113 Id. Although the established regulations only require this of research that is federally
funded, there are various states and academic institutions that also require the same of research
that falls within their respective jurisdictions. Id. at 41-42.
114 Id. at 42.
115 Id
116 Miller, supra note 46, at 210-11. The Act directed the newly created Commission to
"identify the basic ethical principles [that] should underlie the conduct of biomedical and be-
havioral research involving human subjects." Id. at 211 (citing the National Research Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 348 (1972) § 202(a)(l)(A)).
117 The Department of Health and Human Services now administers these functions.
118 Miller, supra note 46, at 211.
119 Jonathan Moreno et al., Updating Protections for Human Subjects Involved in Re-
search, 280 JAMA 1951 (1998).
120 Miller, supra note 46, at 211. The regulation requires:
1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes of the
research and the expanded duration of the subject's participation, a description of the proce-
dures to be followed, and identification of any procedures which are experimental;
2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject;
3) A description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably be
expected from the research;
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eral rules were revised in 1981 and the policy was reissued without
change in 1991.121 Despite the federal attempts at protecting informed
consent, the Nuremberg Code has never itself been codified in federal
law. 122
III. CURRENT FORCES AFFECTING RESEARCH ETHICS
A. FOR-PROFIT RESEARCH
The emergence of for-profit organizations conducting research has
affected the allegiance to ethical principles. 123 Pharmaceutical compa-
nies, pushed by market forces, demand efficiency when developing new
products. In addition, the entire medical system has become increasingly
intertwined with the competition of economics, commerce and technol-
ogy, which do not automatically act in a way that is responsive to the
vulnerabilities of a research subject.1 24 This scenario inevitably includes
human trials. 125 In fact, human research is incredibly important to phar-
4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that
might be advantageous to the subject;
5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records identify-
ing the subject will be maintained;
6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as to whether any com-
pensation and an explanation as to whether any medical treatments are available if injury
occurs and, if so, what they consist of, or where further information may be obtained;
7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the re-
search and research subjects' rights, and whom to contact in the event of a research-related
injury to the subject; and
8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve no pen-
alty or no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled. 45 C.F.R.
§§ 46.116(a)(1-8)(1996).
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1-8)(1999).
In addition, the regulations require that the HHS refuse to award a federal grant for medical
research unless an Institutional Review Board reviews and approves the research protocol.
Miller, supra note 46, at 211.
121 Moreno et al., supra note 119. Very few states have regulations of this nature.
Glantz, supra note 98, at 194. The three states that have passed statutes that regulate human
medical research are California, New York and Virginia. Id.
122 In April of 2001, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission issued a report with
recommendations regarding ethical conduct of international trials. One such recommendation
was to comply with the already existing informed consent requirements. There was no recom-
mendation to either strengthen informed consent or adopt the Nuremberg Code into law. For-
eign Research Guidelines Offered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001; Ethical and Policy Issues in
Research Involving Human Participants, at http://www.bioethics.gov.
123 See Sean Emery & David A. Cooper, Drug Companies Have a Duty to Continue
Treatment, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 889 (1997).
124 Thomasma & Pellegrino, supra note 63, at xvii, xx.
125 Emery & Cooper, supra note 122, at 889. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry claims
that its sponsorship of research and development in developing nations is a benefit for those
involved and that the ethics dilemma threatens the progress. Id. Research supports the devel-
opment of infrastructure and enhances the training and experience of healthcare professionals.
In return, data that define the potential clinical value of new treatments are generated. This
reciprocity is threatened by problems such as the ethical dilemma. Id.
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maceutical research; until a drug is tested on human subjects, there is no
way to determine its efficacy.1 26 It has been argued that it is an absolute
necessity to continue human research. Otherwise, proponents say, there
is a risk of "losing the potential benefits of new remedies, or 'poisoning
ourselves' either with 'insufficiently tested new remedies' or with 'ac-
cepted but unsound old remedies."1 27 The FDA requires any drug ap-
proval to be preceded by research involving human subjects, 128 and the
FDA faces incredible pressures of its own to facilitate the drug-approval
process.1 29 The combination of these forces creates great incentives to
avoid compliance with any regulations that might hinder progress.
B. INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH LOCATIONS
An additional factor affecting ethical principles is the current ten-
dency to perform research in developing countries. 30 "Much of the re-
search in developing countries is conducted or sponsored by the U.S.
government or by pharmaceutical companies seeking product approval
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration."' 13' For pharmaceutical com-
panies, it is simply less expensive to conduct research in developing
countries than it is to conduct the same research in the United States or
other developed countries. 132 The participating nations and their re-
searchers have welcomed this realization on the part of pharmaceutical
126 Miller, supra note 46, at 212 (noting that products that work in test tubes or even on
other animals do not always produce the equivalent result in humans).
127 Verdun-Jones & Weisstub, supra note 78, at 91 (quoting C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERI-
MENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 4 (1974)).
128 Miller, supra note 46, at 204.
129 Id. at 234. "The current lag time between synthesis of a new chemical entity and final
FDA approval averages twelve years. It now costs an average of approximately $231 million
to take a new medicine from the laboratory to the pharmacy. Commentators blame FDA
regulations for both the time delay and its attendant costs. According to them, the FDA drug-
approval process prevents Americans from obtaining innovative new drug therapies in a timely
manner." Id.
130 Troyen A. Brennan, Proposed Revisions to the Declaration of Helsinki-Will They
Weaken the Ethical Principles Underlying Human Research?, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 527
(1999).
131 Foreign Research Guidelines Offered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001; David J. Rothman,
The Shame of Medical Research, (Nov. 30, 2000), at http://nybooks.com/nyrev/WWWfeatdis-
play.cgi?20001130060f (last visited July 30, 2001) (on file with Author) ("The attractions of
conducting research in developing countries are not limited to AIDS or to academic investiga-
tors. Over the past ten years, American drug companies have been reducing their reliance
upon universities to do their research, turning instead to for-profit contract-research organiza-
tions (CROs) .... The CROs locate the research sites, recruit patients, and in some cases even
draw up the study design and perform the analysis. And increasingly, the sites and patients
they choose are abroad, particularly in developing countries."). Id.
132 Rothman, supra at 13 1. This phenomenon follows in the footsteps of other globalized
industries, conducting business in the countries with the lowest costs. Id.
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companies, having been previously excluded in the earlier research
endeavors. 133
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
The AIDS research conducted in Africa was particularly problem-
atic, despite the claim that informed consent existed. Federal regulations
in the United States, while attempting to protect the individual, "do not
go far enough in emphasizing the centrality of the inviolability of the
human rights of research subjects." 134 The history of human medical
research, both within the United States and U.S. funded research in other
locales, glaringly shows the most dubious application of informed con-
sent. A new standard is necessary.
Ideally, the regulations of research should fully reflect the human
rights of the subjects of the medical trials,135 and the underlying ethics
should center around respect for the individual. 136 Objectification, al-
lowing the treatment of the research subject as an end in itself rather than
a means to an end, is prevented when the autonomy of the subject is
respected. 137 The Nuremberg Code itself structures a means to secure
the bodily integrity of every human involved in medical research through
the doctrine of informed consent. 138
This Note proposes that the United States seize the opportunity fol-
lowing the AIDS trials in Africa and publicly acknowledge the inadequa-
cies of existing federal regulations. This Note urges the United States to
fully and finally adopt the Nuremberg Code into law. Too many inci-
dents involving the United States' lack of concern for informed consent
have occurred for this moment in history to pass without
acknowledgement. 139
133 Id. Previously, before the use of developing nations as research sites, the United
States and Europe effectively monopolized medical research. Id.
134 Id. at 24; see also 45 C.F.R. § 46 (providing for protection of human subjects).
135 Katz, supra note 62, at 24. ("This will only happen, however, if it is recognized that
safeguarding such rights requires not only protection from physical harm but also, and equally
important, a commitment to using human beings as means for our ends only with their volun-
tary consent.").
136 Weisstub, supra note 60, at 69.
137 Id.
138 Dyckman, supra note 1, at 91.
139 The historian Mario Biagioli in his essay on the Nazi concentration camp experiments
pleaded that we need
to understand how [medical] science became (and could again become) implicated in
[such a] tragedy .... Unless the greatest care is taken, medical science and physi-
cian-investigators are also trapped into making tragic choices for the sake of science
and at the expense of human beings who serve as subjects of research. This is the
eternal lesson to be learned from Auschwitz. Respect for the person is the only
counterweight to such tragedies.
Katz, supra note 62, at 23.
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Considering the controversy surrounding the AIDS trials in Africa
and the inability, despite all outward professions of compliance, for the
United States to follow the Nuremberg Code, the United States has an
obligation to cease and desist with the current public subterfuge of claim-
ing adherence to principles held with the Code. The Nuremberg Code,
requiring real informed consent, should be accepted as the ideal and in-
corporated fully into federal regulations. Only then will it be possible for
the practice of human medical research to hold within it the ethical prin-
ciples of Nuremberg.
CONCLUSION
The ethical assignment of assuring the respect of an individual's
autonomy is not a simple task. Despite the extensive proliferation of
various rules and regulations concerning human subjects of medical re-
search, the AZT testing in Africa clearly shows that the current approach
to safeguarding human rights by the United States is inadequate. Medi-
cal abuses continue to fail to treat research subjects as fully human. 40
The Unites States, despite a history of past harmful indiscretions and a
publicly espoused commitment to informed consent, once again ignored
the basic principles contained within the Nuremberg Code. A new stan-
dard and a new attitude must be introduced into current federal policy. A
catalyst to change must be instituted that will prevent exploiting people
for research by researchers who whether well or ill-meaning use their
medical authoritative positions to enable their scientific research. The
United States should reaffirm its commitment to individual human rights
by publicly declaring allegiance to the principles within the Nuremberg
Code and cease and desist from research that lacks the true and informed
consent of its human research subjects.
140 Bloche, supra note 57, at 46.
